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G losary of notation 
1. BIG: Bayesian Incentive Compatibility. 
2. EXABB: Ex-ante budget balance. 
3. EXPBB: Ex-post budget balance. 
4. TJ: Set of all possible distributions of N agents among the K valuations in 
the set S = {VI, V2, ... , Vk, ... VK} . 
5. Q:. Set of all provision rules q : TJ -- [0, 1] . 
6. QR: Set. of all provision rules q E Q such that the monotonicity condition 
(T.1.1) in Theorem 1 is satisfied. 
7. T: Set of all tax functions t : TJ __ ~K. 
8. M: Set of mechanisms m = (q, t) E QA X T satisfying BIG and EXPBB. 
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1. Introduction 
This paper focuses on problems where a group of individuals, each of them having 
incomplete information about the others' characteristics, has to decide whether to 
undertake a public project or not and, if undertaken, how to distribute the costs 
of the project among the members of the group. Agents' valuations of the project 
are private information, and it is common knowledge that each agent's valuation 
is generated by a discrete probability distribution. The paper characterizes the 
set of interim incentive efficient mechanisms in this setting. 
The notion of interim incentive efficiency (Holmstrom and Myerson, 1983) dif-
fers from the classical notion of efficiency in two important aspects. First of all, 
it focuses the interim stage (i. e., the stage in the decision process at which the 
individuals know their private information but does not know the others' private 
information) as the relevant stage for welfare evaluation of mechanisms. Second 
of all, it does not refer to feasible decisions but to incentive feasible decision 
mechanisms. The notion of incentive feasibility takes into account both the tech-
nological (or classical) constraints arising because undertaking the public project 
is costly, and the incentive constraints arising due to the informational structure of 
the problem. That is, feasible mechanisms are Bayesian incentive compatible and 
budget balanced (or budget balanced in expectations). Thus, a Bayesian incentive 
compatible, budget balanced mechanism is interim incentive efficient (or simply, 
interim efficient) if there does not exist another Bayesian incentive compatible, 
budget balanced mechanism that, in the interim stage, makes some agents better 
off' without making other agents worse off'. 
The early literature on decision mechanisms in environments with private in-
formation (see e.g., d'Aspremont and Gerard-Varet (1979)) identified Bayesian In-
centive Compatible, budget balanced mechanisms that are efficient ex-post. How-
ever, the fact that a mechanism selects Pareto optimal decisions doest not mean 
that such mechanism is Pareto superior (in the interim stage) to any other any 
other mechanism. In fact, it can be shown that the class of ex - post efficient 
mechanisms form a proper subset of the set of interim efficient mechanisms. The 
interest of characterizing the whole set of interim efficient mechanisms (and not 
just a particular class of mechanisms in this set) arises from both normative and 
positive considerations. 
One the normative side, there might be situations in which the set of mecha-
nisms available is restricted by voluntary participation constraints, imposing that 
a mechanism provides all agents with at least the same expected interim util-
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ity they obtain with a given decision. In many problems (see e.g., Mailath and 
Postlewaite (1990), or Dearden (1997)), ex-post efficient mechanisms fail to satisfy 
voluntary participation constraints. Therefore, exploring other mechanisms satis-
fying certain social objectives is interesting. Note that, if a group of individuals 
unanimously agree on altering a statu quo and use a mechanism instead, selecting 
an interim efficient mechanism exhausts the possibilities for further improvements. 
On the positive side, one might be interested in characterizing the whole set 
of interim efficient mechanism to explore the properties of mechanisms that arise 
in practice. If all decisions (including whether to use a particular mechanism) are 
taken at the interim stage, then the set of interim efficient mechanisms consists on 
those incentive compatible mechanisms for which there is no other mechanism that 
generates unanimous improvement. Thus, we would expect that if an agreement 
on a particular mechanism is reached, then that mechanism should be interim 
efficient. 
In general Bayesian Collective choice problems (see Myerson (1985)), interim 
efficient mechanisms can be characterized as the solutions to a welfare optimiza-
tion problem. More precisely, a mechanism is inte~im incentive efficient if it 
maximizes a weighted average of the agents' interim utilities (subject to Bayesian 
incentive compatibility and budget balance constraints), where this average is 
evaluated with respect to a probability (or welfare) distribution defined on the 
set of types. Several authors (for example, Wilson (1985) and Myerson (1986), in 
the context of private goods; and Ledyard and Palfrey (1998, 1999) in the con-
text of public goods) have explored the properties of the solutions to such welfare 
optimization problems in environments with continuous sets of types. 
In discrete framework, the main contribution is that by Ledyard and Palfrey 
(1994), who have chacterized t.he class of interim efficient mechanisms in a public 
goods setting in which the individuals' valuations take only two possible values. 
An interesting finding of this paper is that interim efficiency can allways be acom-
plished by a majority voting scheme in which the individuals pay different taxes 
depending on the alternative they support. It is also shown that for an appropiate 
selection of the welfare distribution associated to an interim efficient mechanism, 
interim efficiency can be accomplished by a referendum, that is, a pure voting 
scheme that does not require transfers among the individuals. FWthermore, such 
referendum yields ex-post efficient decisions. 
In the present paper, I extend Ledyard and Palfrey' s characterization to en-
vironments in which the set of types is represented by an arbitrary discrete prob-
ability distribution. I also show that interim efficiency can also be implemented 
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by relatively simple mechanisms, namely, weighted voting shcemes in which votes 
are weighted according to the tax paid by the individuals. Furthermore, in some 
special cases with, interim efficiency can be implemented by a referendum that 
does not charge taxes on the participants. 
To be more precise, the results obtained can be summarized as follows: 
Bayesian incentive compatibility 
The paper provides a characterization of the class of Bayesian incentive com-
patible anonymous mechanisms. According to this characterization, interim util-
ities obtained by the agents participating in a mechanism in this class is com-
pletely determined by (1) the provision rule! associated to the mechanism, (2) a 
prespecijied sharing rule that specifies how the surplus that each agent obtains 
by reporting his true valuations is distributed among all participants, and (3) a 
lump sum term that determines the ex. ante expected total taxes associated to the 
mechanism. (Section 3) 
Interim incentive efficiency 
The results above are used to characterize the class of interim efficient mech-
anisms. The provision rule of every mechanism in this class is associated to a 
welfare distribution defined on the set of types. This result is used to characterize 
interim efficient mechanisms as weighted voting schemes to decide whether or not 
the public project should be undertaken. Althoug, in some special cases, interim 
efficiency can be accomplished by a referendum, voting schemes arising with more 
than two types are in general different from those arising in the two-type case. 
By paying different taxes, the participants decide not only the alternative they 
support but also the strength to which they support such alternative. (Section 4) 
2. The problem 
A group of individuals, denoted by I = {I, 2, ... , i, ... N}, has to decide whether 
to undertake a costless2 public project or not. Denote by d E {O, I} the decision 
taken (d = 1 means that the project is undertaken while d = 0 means that 
1 The provision rule of a mechanism, defined in section 1, gives the probability that the public 
project is undertaken as a function of agents' reported valuations. 
2The model can be easily adapted to problems in which the project is costly. 
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the project is not undertaken). Since preferences on the public project differ 
among the individuals, a tax system that collects taxes from some individuals 
to subsidize others is also devised. An allocation is a pair (d, t) E {O, I} X !RN, 
that specifies the decision taken and the tax ti paid by each individual. Each 
individual is assumed to have preferences representable by utility functions ui : 
{O, I} x ~N -+ ~ defined, for all (d, t i ) E {O, I} x!R, by ui(d, t) = vid-ti , where Vi 
is a real number that represents individual i's valuation of the public project. The 
individuals' valuations are independent realizations of a discrete random variable 
V with values on an ordered set S = {VI, v2, ••• , vk, ... VK}, where Vk < Vk+l for all 
k = 1,2, ... ,k, ... K, and VI < 0 < VK. 
Thus, the set of possible types of each agent is {I, 2, ... , k, ... K}. For each 
k E {I, 2, ... , k, ... K}, let trk and Fk be defined, respectively, by 
and 
k 
Fk = L 7rj· 
j=l 
Individuals' valuations are assumed to be private information, and a mech-
anism to elicit the individuals' preferences is devised. As in Ledyard and Pal-
frey (1999), attention is restricted to anonymous mechanisms.3 Let n : SN -+ 
(N U {O}) be a function specifying, for each V E SN and each k E {I, 2, ... , K} , 
the number nk(v) of agents whose valuation equals v. That is, 
n(v) = (n1(v), n2(v), ... , nK (v)), 
where nk : SN -+ NU {O} is defined, for all v E SN and each k E {I, 2, ... K} , by 
nk (11) = # {i El: Vi = Vk} . 
In other words, n determines, for each profile of valuations, a distribution of the 
N individuals among the different valuations in S. Let 1) denote the range of n, 
that is, 
3Restriction to revelation mechanisms can be justified by the revelation principle (See e.g., 
Myerson, 1981). A justification for the use of anonymous mechanism can be found in Mailath 
and Postlewaite (1990, p.361) or Ledyard and Palfrey (1992, p.349). 
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An anonymous mechanism (or, simply, a mechanism) is a pair of functions 
m = (q, t) : 'D -+ [0,1] X !lK 
specifying, for each n E 'D and k = 1,2, ... , K, 
• the probability q(n) that the public project is undertaken, 
• the tax tk(n) paid by an agent reporting a valuation Vk. 
Given a mechanism, the function q : 'D -+ [0, 1] will be referred to as the 
provision rule of the mechanism, and the function t : 'D -+ !lK will be referred to 
as the tax function of the mechanism. 
Since mechanisms depend only on how agents are distributed among the dif-
ferent valuations, the outcome selected by a mechanism will depend only on the 
realization of the discrete random vector n(V). Its probability function, denoted 
by P:V -+ [0, 1] , is given by 
P(n) = Pr [n(V) = n] = ( N ) (IT 7r:k) . 
nIl n2, ... , nK k=l 
The conditional probability that a particular n occurs will be different, however, 
for all agents participating in the mechanism, since these agents are aware of their 
own valuations. More precisely, the probability that n occurs for an agent with 
valuation Vk is given by 
if nk = 0, 
otherwise. 
Equivalently, 
Pk(n) = (;;k) P(n). 
Let m = (q, t) be a mechanism. For each type k E {I, 2, ... , K}, let qk(q) 
and tk(t) denote, respectively, the expected probability of provision and the ex-
pected tax paid for an agent reporting Vk, when all other agents report their true 
valuations, that is, 
qk(q) = L q(n)Pk(n) = L (;; ) q(n)P (n) , 
nE1' nE1' k 
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and 
tk(t) = L tk(n)Pk(n) = L (;: ) tk(n)P(n). 
nED nED k 
Also, let T(t) denote the expected per capita tax of a mechanism m = (q, t), 
under the assumption that all agents report their true valuatiollS. That is, 
Agents valuations are private information, and mechanisms must induce agents to 
report their true valuations. A mechanism m = (q, t) satisfies Bayesian incentive 
compatibility (BIG) if for any two k, k E {I, 2, ... , K} one has 
that is, a mechanism m satisfies BIG if reporting the true valuation is a Bayesian 
equilibrium of the revelation game induced by the mechanism. 
Note that nothing in the definition of a mechanism guarantees that the decision 
is feasible, in the sense that taxes paid by all agents are non-negative. A first 
condition that is discussed, called ex-post feasibility, is relevant if the group of 
agents involved in the collective decision does not have access to outside resources 
and therefore taxes paid by all agents must be non-negative in every "state of 
nature". More precisely, a mechanism m = (q, t) is feasible ex-post (EXPF) if 
for each n E 1) one has 
K L nktk(n) ~ o. (EXPF) 
k=l 
If agents have access to an outside insurance market, the relevant feasibility condi-
tion is ex ante feasibility (EX AF), that requires that a mechanism (q, t) satisfies 
~ (t,n.t.(n)) P(n) ~ o. (EXAF) 
It should be noticed that condition EXAF above is meaningless when applied to 
a mechanism for which BIG is not satisfied since there is no reason to presume 
that the expression 
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corresponds to the actual expected taxes of a mechanism. 
A stronger condition that is used in the literature is that of budget balance, 
that requires that the mechanism be feasible and non-wasteful, in the sense that 
taxes paid by some of the agents do not exceed the transfers received by others. 
A mechanism m = (q, t) satisfies ex-post budget balance if for each n E 1) one has 
K L nktk(n) = 0. (EXPBB) 
k=l 
If the individuals have acces to outside resources, the relevant budget balance 
condition is ex-ante budget balance, that requires that a mechanism (q, t) satisfies 
(EXABB) 
Note that a risk neutral external agent who acts as a broker in a mechanism sat-
isfying EX ABB and BIG, subsidizing agents when a .deficit arises and collecting 
any surplus, breaks even in expectations. 
3. Incentive compatible mechanisms 
This section characterizes the set of Bayesian incentive compatible mechanisms. 
Denote by Q and T , respectively, the set of all provision rules q : 1) -.. [0,1] and 
tax functions t : 1) -.. ~K. 
Theorem 1. A mechanism m = (q, t) E Q x T satisfies BIG if and only if 
(T.l.l) for every k E {l,2,3, ... ,K -I} one has 
qk+l (q) ~ qk(q), 
and 
(T.l.2) there exists a vector f3 = {f3k}~~l E [0,lJ K- 1 such that for every k E 
{l, 2, 3, ... , K - l} one has 
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3.1. Sharing rules 
Theorem I provides two conditions characterizing the set of mechanisms satisfying 
BIG. The intuition behind these conditions is the following. Let m = (q, t) be 
an arbitrary mechanism. For any arbitrary type k, the term 
is the utility gain or surplus, if no taxes were paid, obtained by an agent with valu-
ation Vk+l when he reports his true valuation instead of reporting Vk. Analogously, 
the term 
Vk [qk(q) - qk+l (q)] = -Vk [qk+1 (q) - qk(q)] 
is the utility obtained by an agent with valuation Vk when he reports his true 
valuation instead of reporting Vk+l (if no taxes were paid). Notice that 
is the joint surplus obtained jointly by any two agents of types k and k + I if 
they report their true valuations instead of reporting the other's valuation. Thus, 
condition (T.I.I) ensures that, before any taxes are paid, agents of types k and 
k + 1 obtain a non negative joint surplus by reporting their true valuations. In 
what follows, the set of provision rules q E Q satisfying (T.I.I) will be denoted 
by QR. 
Taking into account the taxes paid under the mechanism m, the actual surplus 
obtained by an agent with valuation Vk+l when he reports his true valuation 
instead of reporting Vk is given by, 
Vk+l [qk+l(q) - qk(q)] - (tk+1Ct) - tk(t)). 
Substituting (tk+1 (t) - h(t)) by its expression in (T.I.2) yields 
Vk+l [qk+l(q) - qk(q)] - (tk+1(t) - tk(t)) = (Vk+1 - Vk) [qk+1(q) - qk(q)] (1- f3k)· 
Analogously, the surplus obtained by an agent with valuation Vk when he reports 
his true valuation instead of reporting Vk+1 is given by 
Vk [qk(q) - qk+2(q)] - (tk(t) - tk+1(t)) = (Vk+1 - Vk) [qk+1(q) - qk(q)] f3k· 
Call any vector f3 E [0, I]K-l a sharing rule. Thus, condition (T.I.2) states that 
any incentive compatible mechanism m defines implicitly at least one (and possibly 
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many) sharing rule f3 that det.ermines how any two types k and k + I share the 
joint surplus obtained by reporting their true valuations instead of the valuation 
corresponding to the other type. Since condition (T.1.I) guarantees this joint 
surplus is non-negative, both types of agents obtain non negative utility gains by 
reporting their true valuations instead of reporting the valuation corresponding 
to the other type. 
Note that for any mechanism m and any two {3, (3' E [0,lt-1 satisfying 
(T.1.2) one has f3k =I- f3~ only if qk+l (q) = qk(q), where q is the provision rule 
of the mechanism. Thus, f3 and {3' are equal except for those coordinates k E 
{1,2, ... ,K - I} for which the surplus obtained jointly by agents k and k + I is 
zero. Given a provision rule q E QR, any two sharing rules f3, f3' E [O,I]K-lsuch 
that. f3k = f3~ whenever qk+l (q) =I- qk(q) will be said to be equivalent (with respect 
to q). Thus, for any mechanism m satisfying BIG, the set of all sharing rules 
f3 E [O,l]K-I satisfying (T.1.2) are equivalent with respect to the provision rule 
of the mechanism. Among these, let f3(m) be the sharing rule f3 satisfying (T.1.2) 
such that f3k = ° whenever qk+1 (q) = qk(q). Such sharing rule is uniquely defined, 
and it will be referred to as the sharing rule associated to m. 
3.2. Reduced form representation of mechanisms 
Given a mechanism m = (q, t), let U k(m) be the interim expected utility obtained 
by an agent. of type k participating in the mechanism m, that is, 
Thus, the interim expected utilities obtained by agents are completely determined 
by its provision rule and the vector {tk(t) }:=l the interim expected tax paid by 
each type of agent. 
Consider now an arbitrary pair (q, (3) E QR x [0, It-I. Note that one can 
allways obtain a mechanism m = (q,t) satisfying BIG and EXABB such that 
f3 is equivalent to the sharing rule (3( m). A particular construction is as follows. 




It is straightforward to check that such vector {Ckl~=l exists an it is unique. Let 
t* : V ~ ~K be defined, for each nE V and each k = 1,2, ... ,K, by tk(n) = ck. 
Clearly, the mechanism (q, t*) satisfies (T.2.2) and, hence, it satisfies BIG. 
Also, it follows from Proposition that for any mechanism m' = (q', t') satisfying 
BIG and EXABB such that q' = q and t3(rn) = {3, the vector {tk(t')}:=l spec-
ifying the interim expected taxes paid by each type of agent must be a solution 
to (3.2.1) and (3.2.2). Therefore, for each k = 1,2, ... , K, one has 
tk(t*) = tk(t') = Ck· 
Select now C = c( q, (3) in such a way that 
K L 7rktk(tC) = o. 
k=l 
Note that such c = c( q, (3) exists and it is unique. It follows that for every 
mechanism m* = (q*, t*) satisfying BIG and EXABB such that q = q' and 
(3(m) = (3 one has 
Summarizing, it is allways possible to construct a particular mechanism m 
satisfying BIG and EX AB B from a provision rule q E QR and a sharing rule 
f3 E [O,I}K-l. Also, although many other mechanisms that differ only on the 
tax functions may satisfy these requirements, it follows from Theorem 1 that all 
of them yield the same interim expected taxes (and, hence, the same interim 
expected utilities) to all agents. In what follows, any two mechanisms yielding 
the same interim utilities to all agents will be said to be interim equivalent. Thus, 
Theorem 1 establishes an interim equivalence between the set QR x [O,l]K-l and 
the set of all mechanisms m E QR X T satisfying BIG and EXABB. 
Proposition 1 below establishes that for any mechanism m E QR X T satisfying 
BIG and EX AB B, there exists an interim equivalent mechanism rn' E QR X T 
satisfying BIG and EX P BB. That is, welfare properties that can be achieved 
by mechanisms satisfying BIG and EXABB can also be achieved by mechanisms 
satisfying BIG and EXPBB. 
Proposition 1. For any mechanism rn E QR X T satisfying BIG and EXABB, 
there exists an interim utility equivalent mechanism rn' E QR X T satisfying BIG 
and EXPBB. 
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In what follows, the set of mechanisms satisfying BIG and EXABB will be 
denoted by M. In view of the interim equivalence established by Theorem 1, the 
vector 
mR = (q,13(m)) E QR x [0,lt-1 
associated to any m E M will be called the reduced form4 representation of m. 
Note also that for any 
one can use a construction like the one used above to identify a structural form 
m = (q, t) E QR X 7, which is unique except for transformations that preserve 
interim utilities. entify a structural form m = (q, t) E QR X 7, which is unique 
except for transformations that preserve interim utilities. For any mechanism in 
reduced form (q,13) E QR x [0, I]K-l and each k = 1,2, ... , K - 1, let 
where m E M is any mechanism such that 13(m) = 13: 
4. Interim efficient mechanisms 
This section explores the efficiency properties of mechanisms satisfying BIG and 
EX P BB. When the agents unanimously agree to give up a statu quo decision and 
use a mechanism, it seems plausible that in considering alternative mechanisms 
agents will agree on a mechanism from which unanimous improvements in interim 
utilities are not possible. In situations in which agents evaluate the consequences 
of using different mechanisms once they are aware of their valuations but not of 
other agents' valuations, mechanisms having this property have been referred to 
as interim efficient mechanisms5 
Formally, a mechanism m E M is interim incentive efficient if there does not 
exist any other mechanism m' E M such that, for all k E {I, 2, ... , k, ... K} one 
has 
(E.l) 
4This use of the term reduced form is different from Ledyard and Palfrey's (1992), who define 
the reduced form of a mechanism as a vector (q, I) E [O,I]K X !RK representing the vector of 
expected probabilities of provision and expected taxes associated to a mechanism. 
5See Holmstrom and Myerson (1983). 
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and, for some j E {I, 2, ... , k, ... , K}, 
(E.2) 
Let 6.8 denote the set of probability distributions with support on the set of 
valuations, that is, 
Note that the vector ?T = (?Tb ?T2, ... , ?Tk, ... ?TK) is a member of 6.S. A distribution 
9 E 6.S will be regarded as a welfare distribution defined on the set of valuations 
S. For each 9 E 6.S, let G = (G1,G2 , ... ,GK ) be the vector specifying the "cumu-
lative welfare" associated to each type, that is, for each k E {I, 2, ... , k, ... , K} , 
Holmstrom and Myerson (1983) has shown that an interim efficient mecha-
nism can be "rationalized" as the solution to a constrained welfare maximization 
problem. More precisely, an interim incentive efficient mechanism maximizes a 
weighted average of an agents' interim utility, where the welfare weight given to 
each type of agent is determined by an arbitrary welfare distribution 9 on the set 
of valuations. That is, a mechanism m* = (q*, t*) E M is interim efficient if it 
solves 
~~ {t 9kUk(m)} (P.I) 
Taking into account the interim utility equivalence established by Theorem 1 and 
Proposition 1, one obtains 
Proposition 2. A mechanism m* = (q*, t*) E M is interim efficient i/ and 
only if the exists 9 E 6.S such that its reduced/arm (q*, (3(m*)) solves 
max {~9kU:(q,{3)} . QR[OlJK-l ~ 
, k=l 
(P.2) 
Observe that, for every 9 E 6.S, the set QR x [0,It-1 of mechanisms in 
reduced form is compact and the function function E~=l gkU:(.,.) is continuous. 
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Therefore a solution to (P.2) exists. Given a distribution 9 E 6S and a mechanism 
in reduced form (q, (3) E QR X [0,1(-1 , the number L:~=1 gkU~(q, (3) will be 
referred to as the mechanism's average welfare (with respect to the distribution 
g). 
4.1. Interim incentive efficient mechanisms as voting schemes 
Let W = (Wl' W2, ... , Wk) E ~K be a vector of weights such that 
Wl =:; W2 =:; ... =:; Wk =:; Wk+1 =:; WK· 
Also, let q E QR be a provision rule satisfying, for each n E V, 
K 
q(n) = 
0, whenever L Wknk < ° : 
k=l 
K 
1, whenever L Wknk > 0. 
k=l 
(4.1.1) 
Consider now a mechanism m = (q, t) E M such that q satisfies (4.1.1) for 
some w E ~K. Such mechanism can be seen as a weighted voting scheme (with 
weights W E ~K) to decide whether or not the public project should be un-
dertaken. When an individual reports his valuation, he is in fact choosing the 
strength to which he supports (or opposes if the corresponding coefficient is neg-
ative) the public project. Note that the tax paid by an agent depends upon the 
valuation he reports, and therefore an agent, when choosing the strength to which 
he supports or opposes the public project, must account for the cost (in taxes) of 
such a choice. 
A particular family of provision rules in the class described above are Q-
majority voting rules. A provision rule q is an Q- majority voting rule if there 
exists Q E [0,1] such that q satisfies, for all n E V, 
{ 
0, if L: nk =:; Q(N - n a ), 
( ) k:1IA:>O q n = 1 if L: nk > o:(N - na); 
k:1I/c>O 
where na denotes the number of individuals such that Va = 0 (Thus, such number 
na will be equal to zero if Va ~ S). Recall that for each n E Vone has 
L nk + L nk = N - na· 
k:1IA:>O k:1I/c<O 
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and therefore a majority voting rules satisfies 
I 0, q(n) = 1 if (1 - a) L nk - a L nk ~ 0, k:Vk>O k:Vk<O if (1 - a) L nk - a L nk > 0. k:Vk >0 k:Vk <0 
Thus, majority voting rules are indeed a particular class of weighted. voting rules. 
It is now shown that a mechanism (q, t) such that q is a a-majority voting 
rule and t satisfies t (n) = ° for each n E V, satisfies BIG. To see this, observe 
first that every a-majority rule satisfies (T.1.1). Thus, in order to show such a 
mechanism satisfies BIG, it only remains to be shown that there exists a sharing 
rule f3 E [0, l]K-l such that, for each k = 1,2, .. , K - 1, 
(4.1.2) 
which, taking into account that t = ° is equivalent to 
(4.1.3) 
In order to show a sharing f3 E [0, 1t-l exists, it is useful to distinguish between 
two possible cases. Suppose first there exists a type a such that Va = 0. In this 
case, it is straightforward to check that a sharing rule f3 E [O,l]K-l such that 
f3a - 1 = 1 and f3 a = ° satisfies (4.1.3). If there does not exist a such that Va = 0, 
let p be the highest type such that vp < ° and let f3 E [0, l]K-l be such that 
Clearly, such a sharing rule sat.isfies (4.1.3). Thus, a majority voting scheme with-
out taxes satisfies BIG and EXPBB. In what follows, such a mechanism will be 
referred to as a referendum. 
Theorems 2 and 3 characterize the class of interim efficient mechanism as a 
particular class of weighted voting schemes. To obtain the weights associated. to 
interim efficient voting schemes, let w : b.Sx [0, l]K-l -+ ~K be defined, for each 
k El, 2, ... , K - 1, by 
16 
if k = 1; 
if k = 2, ... K; 
if k = K. 
Also, let {39 E [0, 1t-l be a sharing rule satisfying, for each k = 1,2, ... ,K -1, 
{3!? = { 1, whenever Fj - Gj < 0; 
J 0, whenever Fj - Gj > O. 
(BR) 
Finally, let w9 = w(g, (39). Note that w9 is well defined. For each k = 1,2, ... , K, 
the number wf will be referred to as type k's virtual weight. 
Theorem 2. Let 9 E ~B be such that wf ~ w~ ~ ... ~ w: ~ w:+1 ~ ... ~ wk 
and let (q*, (3*) be such that the following two conditions are satisfied: 
(T.2.1) {3'" is equivalent (with respect to q"') to a sharing rule (39 satisfying (BR); 
and 
(T.2.1) q* satisfies, for each nE D, 
q*(n) = 
Then (q*,;3*) solves (P.2). 
K 
0, whenever L Wfnk ~ 0, 
k=l 
K 
1, whenever L Wfnk > O. 
k=l 
Thus, if the welfare distribution 9 satisfies wf ~ w~ ~ ... ~ wf ~ wf+l ~ 
... ~ wi<, the provision rule of the inetrim efficient mechanism associated to 9 
is a weighted voting scheme with weights given by w9 • To see how weights are 
determined, note first that each weight wf can be written equivalently as 
In order to understand the role of these weights, it might be useful to think of a 
social planner who has to decide the strength that each agent's vote should have 
in order to maximize the average interim utility (with respect to a distribution 
g) associated to a mechanism in reduced form. An intuitive way to proceed for 
this planner would be to increase the probability of provision whenever someone 
reports a positive valuation, and to decrease it when it is negative. However, in-
creasing the probability of provision for an agent reporting a particular valuation 
Vk might have negative effects on expected taxes that can be collected from agents 
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with higher valuations (if taxes paid by these agents were too high, they might 
have incentives to understate their valuations). Thus, the value that the planner 
assigns to valuation Vk needs to be modified. Notice that (Vk - Vk-l) (1 - {3k-l) 
represents the effect (of increasing the probability of provision) on utility gains 
obtained by agents with valuation Vk if they report Vk instead of Vk-b while 
(Vk+l - Vk) {3k represents the effect on utility gains obtained by agents with valua-
tion Vk if they report Vk instead of Vk+l. The corrections applied will be increasing 
in the expected number of agents with valuation higher than Vk (represented by 
(1 - Fk - 1 ) and (1 - Fk )) and decreasing in cumulative welfare associated to these 
agents (represented by (1 - Gk - 1 ) and (1 - Gk )). Also, the rule ({3~, 1 - {3~) de-
termining how any two agents of types k arid k + 1 share the joint surplus they 
obtain by reporting there true valuations depends on whether or not type k's 
cumulative welfare Gk is higher than its cumulative probability Fk , as condition 
(SR) states. Finally, corrections applied are proportional to N~k' the inverse of 
the expected number of individuals of type k. It should be noticed that for every 
g E 6S, the ex-ante expected value of agent's virtual valuation equals 
K K 
L 7l"kW f = LgkVk. 
k=l k=l 
4.2. Ex post efficiency 
A commonly studied case is that for which g = 7l". That is, the cumulative welfare 
corresponding to any valuation corresponds to its cumulative probability. Provi-
sion rules that maximize average welfare (with respect to the welfare distribution 
7l") satisfy, for all n E 'D, 
q(n) = 
K 
0, whenever L Vknk ~ 0, 
k=l 
K 
1, whenever L Vknk > 0; 
k=l 
(4.1.4) 
Therefore, the project is undertaken if the sum of the individuals' valuations 
is positive. This corresponds to the ex-post efficiency criterium and, therefore, 
such provision rules select ex-post efficient decisions. Furthermore, observe that 
since Fk = Gk for each k = 1,2, ... , K - 1, any sharing rule {3 E [0,1t-1 satisfies 
condition (SR) and, therefore, any sharing rule maximizes average welfare (with 
respect to g = 7l"). 
18 
As a particular case, suppose K = 2. Since any sharing rule associated to a 
referendum maximizes average welfare (with respect to the welfare distribution 
9 = 71'), one might select a sharing rule f31 E [0,1] such that 
Thus, a mechanism m = (q, t) such that 
is interim efficient. Thus, interim efficiency (and ex-post efficiency), can be ac-
complished by a referendum6 • In fact, the welfare distribution 9 = 1r is the only 
one for which a referendum maximizes average welfare in the two-type case. Note 
that for any other welfare function 9 one has Fl - G1 = 1rl - 91 =I=- 0 and there-
fore maximizing the average welfare requires a sharing rule {3~ =I=- {3i that yields 
different taxes to agents voting in favor (or against) the public project. 
Note that Theorem 2 does not apply to all welfare distributions 9 E ~S 
for which there exists k such that wf > Wf+l' since in this case a provision 
rule with weights given by wg might fail to satisfy the monotonicity condition 
(T.1.1). Theorem 3 provides a procedure to compute interim efficient mechanisms 
associated to such distributions. Some additional notation is introduced first. 
Let>. = (>'1,>'2, .'" >'K-1) E ~~-1 be arbitrary. Also, given 9 E ~S, let 
X~~-1 -+ ~K be defined, for each (g,>.) E ~~-1 and each k = 1,2, .... ,K, by 
Wf(>.) = { 
if k = 1; 
if k = 2, ... ,Kj 
if k = K. 
Theorem 3. Let 9 E ~S be arbitrary. Then a mechanism in reduced form 
(q*, {3*) E QR X [0,1t-1 solves (P.2) if and only if there exists >'* E ~-1 such 
that 
6Ex-post efficiency of referenda in the two-type case has been established by Ledyard and 
Palfrey (1994). It should be noticed, however, that they study a problem in which undertaking 
the project costs C units of a private good. Thus, when decisions are taken by using a referendum 
and the project is undertaken, it is necessary to charge positive taxes from the &gents in order 
to cover costs. Taxes paid in this case, are lump sum. 
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(T.3.1) {3* is equivalent (with respect to q*) to a sharing rule (39 satisfying (SR); 
(T.3.2) q* satisfies, for each n E 'D, 
q*(n) = 
K 
0, whenever L wH,x*)nk < 0, 
k=l 
K 
1, whenever L Wf(,x*)nk > 0; 
k=l 
(T.3.3) ,x* satisfies, for each k = 1,2, "., K - 1, 
Notice that Theorem 2 follows straightforward as a corollary of Theorem 3. To 
see this, simply observe that if 9 satisfies wf S w~ S ,''' S wk , then a provision 
rule q* satisfying (T.2.1) yields, for each k = 1,2, "., K - 1, 
Also, the vector ,x * = 0 yields, for each k = 1,2, "., K - 1, 
W~(O) = w~. 
Thus, the pair (q*, 0) satisfies (T.3.3). Therefore the mechanism in reduced form 
(q*,(3*) satisfying (T.2.1) and (T.2.2) maximizes average welfare (with respect to 
the welfare distribution g). 
The intuition behind Theorem 3 is the following. Suppose a distribution 9 
yields a system of weights W9 such that wk > wk+l for some k = 1,2, "., K - 1. 
Then a provision rule q* satisfying (T.2.2) might fail to satisfy the monotonicity 
constraints in condition (T.l.1) and therefore q* tt QR. Thus, in order to obtain 
the provision rule that maximizes welfare, each virtual weights wf is modified 
whenever the monotonicity consntraint in (T.l.1) is binding. Notice that for 
every ,x E ~~ -lone has 
K K K-l K K L 7l'kWk(,x) = L 7l'kWk + L (,xk - ,xk+l) +,xK = L 7l'kWk = L9kWk, 
k=l k=l k=l k=l k=l 
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and therefore the vector illf (>. *) modifies w9 without altering the expected virtual 
weight of an individual. Thus, given an arbitrary 9 and a vector >. * satisfying 
(T.3.3), for each k = 1,2, ... , K, the number Wf(>' *) will be referred to as type k's 
generalized virtual weight (associated to g). 
An important consequence of Theorem 3 is that pooling of types might ap-
pear in some interim incentive efficient mechanism. That is, there might exist 
an interim incentive efficient mechanism (q*, t*) and two types k, k' such that 
illf(>'*} = illf(>'*}. Note that such mechanisms one has qk(q*) = qk'(q*} and, hence, 
tk(t*} = h{t*)). Ledyard and Palfrey (1994) have shown that with two types of 
agents the only mechanisms for which pooling of types occur are either a constant 
mechanism for which the project is always undertaken, or a mechanism for which 
for all distributions of valuations the provision rule is a lottery between the two 
alternatives available. With more than two types, other interim incentive efficient 
mechanisms exhibiting pooling of types might exist. 
4.3. Interim efficiency of Referenda 
Recall that a voting rule without taxes is called a referendum. Also, recall that in 
problems with only two types, the only welfare distribution that can be maximized 
by a referendum is that distribution satisfying F == G. Clearly, this result does 
not hold in problems with more than two types, since in this case the weighted 
voting rule that maximizes average welfare (with respect to 9 = 7r), yields different 
weights to any two agents with different types. Thus, a system of taxes is required 
to preserve incentive compatibility of such a mechanism. 
Surpisingly, in problems with more than two types, there exists other welfare 
distributions that can be maximized by a referendum. For example, consider a 
problem described by 
S = {-5,-3,0,3,} 
and 
1 
7rk = 4 for every k = 1, ... , K. 
Let 9 = (0, 3/4,0, 1/4). Note that such distribution yields 
wf - -5; 
w~ - -3 1/4 _ (1/4}3 = -5' + 1/4 1/4 ' 
w~ - 0' , 
w9 4 - 3 
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Thus, per capita welfare is maximized by a mechanism in reduce form (q*, (3*) 
such that {3* is equivalent to a sharing rule (39 = (0,1,0) and q* satisfies, for each 
nE'D, 




q*(n) = 1 
if ~ 2: nk - ~ 2: nk :5 0, 
k:Vk >0 k:Vk <0 
if ~ 2: nk - ~ 2: nk > 0. 
k:Vk>O k:Vk<O 
Thus, the provision rule that maximizes per capita welfare is a (5/8)-majority 
voting rule. Also, since (39 = (0,1,0), a mechanism (q, t) such that q = q* and 
t = 0 is interim efficient. 
However, under under weak assumptions on the distribution generating the 
agents' valuations, referenda are not interim efficient, as shown in Proposition 4 
below. 
Proposition 4. Suppose K ~ 4, V2 < 0 and VK-l ~ 0. Then an interim efficient 
referendum mechanism does not exist. 
Thus, the possibility of achieving efficiency by a referendum is ruled out in 
problems in which the range of possible valuations for tyhe public project are 
sufficiently rich. 
5. Concluding Remarks 
One of the main results in the paper characterizes the set of Bayesian incentive 
compatible mechanisms in discrete public good problems in which the set of valu-
ations is also discrete. This characterization allows one to obtain the set of interim 
efficient mechanisms in this setting. Provision rules corresponding to interim in-
centive efficient mechanisms can be described as weighted voting schemes, and 
therefore interim efficiency can be achieved in a relatively simple way. Further-
more, in some cases, a simple referenda that does not impose any taxes on the 
agents might accomplish interim efficiency. 
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Several extensions that are worth exploring. One of them is to explore the 
assymptotic properties of interim efficient mechanisms in the presence of a large 
number of individuals, as studied by Ledyard and Palfrey (1998) in problems with 
a continuum of types. 
In this paper, Ledyard and Palfrey have shown that, in problems with con-
tinuous sets of types, any interim efficient mechanism can be approximated by a 
referendum. The intuition behind this result is the following: in the presence of 
a large number of individuals, the probability that a particular agent is pivotal 
vanishes as the number of agents increases, and thus incentive compatibility con-
straints imply that the expected tax paid by each agent converges to zero. Hence, 
interim utilities obtained by agents participating in a mechanism depends only of 
the limit probability that the project is undertaken and, therefore, on the limit 
distribution of the agents' average virtual valuation. Therefore, a referendwn in 
which votes in favor and against the projest are weighted in such a way that 
the expected weight coincide with the expected virtual valuation associated to an 
interim efficient mechanism, will yield the same limit probability of provision. 
Thus, the results obtained here suggests that the result obtained by Ledyard 
and Palfrey apply also to discrete frameworks. It should be noticed, however, 
that many other weighted voting schemes might also approximate interim efficient 
mechanisms in the presence of a large nwnber of individuals. In addition, some 
of the problems associated to other weighted voting schemes in small economies 
(such as the necessity of designing a balanced tax function to ensure manipula-
tion of votes) might become less important in the presence of a large number of 
individuals (for example, by designing the tax system in such a way that taxes 
are paid only when agents are pivotal). Therefore using other weighted voting 
schemes to approximate interim efficiency might be interesting. 
Other possible extension would be to explore whether the class of mechanisms 
studied here might be applied also to environments with continuous sets of types. 
In addition, some of the conceptual framework proposed could be relevant in ex-
ploring the set of interim efficient mechanism in other problems, such as provision 
of excludable public goods or trading private goods. 
Finally, another extension would be introducing voluntary participation con-
straints in the optimization problem associated to interim incentive efficiency, 
where these voluntary participation constraints refer to other (not necessarily 
constant) mechanism. This might be interesting for practical aspects of mecha-
nism design, since it allows one to study whether or not all agents involved in the 
problem might agree to alter a statu quo when this statu quo is a well established 
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mechanism (e.g., a referendum). In addition, vohmtary participation constraints 




Theorem 1. A mechanism m = (q, t) E Q x T satisfies Bl C if and only if 
T.1.1 for every k E {1, 2,3, ... , K - 1} one has 
qk+1 (q) ~ qk(q), 
T.1.2 there exists a vector 13 = {13k}~,,:;l E [0, 11K - 1 such that for every k E 
{I, 2, 3, ... , K - I} one has 
tk+l (t) - tk(t) = [13kVk+l + (1 - 13k) vk1 (qk+1 (q) - qk(q)) . 
Proof: Necessity is proved. first. Let m == (q, t) E Q x T be a mechanism 
satisfying BIG. Note that m satisfies, for any k = 1,2, ... , K - 1, 
(A.l) 
and 
Vkqk(q) - tk(t) ~ vkqk+1(q) - tk+1(t). (A.2) 
Adding up terms in each side of the inequalities one has 
(Vk+l - Vk) [qk+l (q) - qk(q)] ~ O. (A.3) 
Hence, as Vk+l > Vk, (A.3) yields 
qk+1(q) ~ qk{q), 
and t.herefore (T.1.l) is satisfied. To show (T.1.2) is satisfied, use again (A.l) and 
(A.2) to obtain 
tk(t) + Vk [qk+l(q) - qk(q)] :5 tk+l(t) :5 tk(t) + Vk+1 [qk+l(q) - qk(q)]. ((A.4)) 
Note that ifqk+l (q) = qk(q), then t k+1(t) = tk(t). Let now 13 E [0, It-1 be defined, 
for all k E {I, ... , K - I} , by 
{ 
tk+l(t) - tk(t) - ~k (qk+l(q~ - qk(q)), 
{3k = (Vk+l - Vk) (qk+l(q) - qk(q)) ifqk+1(q) > qk(q), 
o if qk+1 (q) = qk(q). 
((A.5)) 
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Clearly, such 13 satisfies (T.1.2). Note also from (AA) that each f3k E [0,1]. 
To prove sufficiency, let m be a mechanism satisfying (T.l.1) and (T.l.2). Con-
sider two arbitrary types k, k' E {1, 2, ... K} and assume, without loss of generality 
that k > k'. Then, 
k-l 
tk(t) - tk,(t) - L (tj+1(t) - tj(t)) 
j=k' 
k-l 
- L [f3jvi+1 + (1 - f3j) vi] [qj+1 (q) - qj(q)] . 
j=k' 
Recall that Vj+l > Vj for any j : k' :::; j < k. Taking into account also that 
f3 j E [0,1] and [qj+l(q) - qj(q)] 2: 0 one has 
k-l 




< Vk L [qj+l(q) - qj(q)] = Vk [qk(q) - qk,(q)]· 
j=k' 
Vkqk(q) - tk(t) 2: vkqk,(q) - tk,(t), 
therefore establishing that (q, t) satisfies BIG. This completes the proof of The-
orem 1.11 
the 
Proposition 2. For any (q, (3) E QR x [0, It-I, there exists a tax function t 
ET such that 
(P.2.1) the pair m = (q, t) E QR X T satisfies BIG and EXPBB; 
(P.2.2) its associated sharing rule f3(m) satisfies, for all k = 1,2, ... , K - 1, 
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Proof. Let (q, (3) E QR X [0,1]K-1 be arbitrary and let t* ET be a tax function 
such that the mechanism (q,t) satisfies EXABB and, for each k = 1,2, ... ,K -1, 
Also, let t : V -+ ~K be defined, for each n E D and each k = 1,2, .... , K, by 
Let m = (q, t). Notice that for k E {1, 2, ... , K} one has 
tk(t) = L tk(n)Pk (n) . 
nE"D 
Thus, 
I.(t) = (N ~ 1) ~ C~~l nj ~.(n - Ij(t')]) p. (n). 
Note from the definitions that, for any n E V such that nk > 0, Pk (n) equals 
the probability that the distribution n' = (nI, n2, ... , nk - 1, ... nK) occurs in a 
decision problem with N - 1 agents. That is, let V' denote the set of all possible 
distributions of N -1 agents among the set ofvaluations S, and let pI: V -+ [0,1] 
be its probability function. Then for all n E V such that nk > ° one has 
Therefore, 
Also, from the properties of multinomial distributions yields 
~, C~~l nj ~.(t') - Ij(t')]) P(n') = (N -1) C~~l1fi ~.(t') - I; (t')] ) 
- (N - 1) [I.(t') - f>;I;(t')] . 
3=1 
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which taking into account that t* satisfies EX ABB yields 
tk(t) = tk(t*). 
Hence, (q, t) satisfies BIG and {3(m) = {3. To complete the proof, it only remains 
to be shown that m satisfies EXPBB. Total taxes equal, for all n E 'D, 
Thus, m satisfies EXPBB. This completes the proof of Proposition 2.11 
Theorem 2. Let 9 E ~S be such that wi ::; w~ ::; ... ::; wf ::; wf+l ::; ... ::; wk 
and let (q*, {3*) E MR be a mechanism in reduced form such that the following 
two conditions are satisfied: 
(T.2.1) {3* is equivalent (with respect to q*) to the sharing rule {39; 
and 
(T.2.1) q* satisfies, for each nE D, 
q*(n) = 
Then (q*,{3*) solves (P.2). 
K 
0, whenever L w:nk :::; 0, 
k=l 
K 
1, whenever L w:nk > 0. 
k=l 
Proof. Given 9 E ~S be such that wi :::; w~ :::; ... :::; w: :::; w:+l :::; ... :::; wk. 
Observe that these inequalities imply that q* E QR and therefore a pair (q*, {3*) 
satisfying (T.2.1) and (T.2.2) is a mechanism in reduced form. It is now shown 
that any such pair solves (P.2). 
(1) First, it is shown first that for every (q, {3) E QR x [O,l]K-l one hasFirst, 
it is shown first that for every (q, {3) E QA x [0, It-l one has 
K 1 (K ) £; gkU:(q, {3) = N ~ £; Wk(g, {3)nk q(n)P(n). (A.6) 
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To prove that (A.6) is satisfied, let m = (q, t) E M be a mechanism in structural 
form satisfying, for each k = 1,2, ... , K, 
Uk(m) = U~(q, (3) 
From the definitions one has 
U~+1 (q, (3) - U~(q, (3) = Vk+lqk+l (q) - vkqk(q) - ~k+1 (t) - tk(t)] 
and, since m satisfies (T.1.2) and (3(m) = (3, 
-R -R Uk+1(q,{3)-Uk (q,{3) - Vk+1qk+l(q)-vkqk(q) 
- [{3kVk+l + (1 - (3k) Vk] (qk+1 (q) - qk(q)) . 
Therefore 
((A.7)) 
Observe now that for for every distribution 9 E 6.8 one has 
K L 9kU~(q, (3) 
k=l 
- U~(q,p) (t 9') + t 9' (U:(q, 13) - U~(q,p)) 
K K-l 
- U~(q,{3) - L9k L (U:+1(q,{3) - U:(q,{3)) 
k=l j=k 
Also, 
t 9kU:(q, i3l = t 'lrkU:(q,p) - t (9k - 'Irk) (~ (u:+l(q, 13) - U:(q,p)) ) . 
Substituting each term [Dj+1(m) - Uj(m)] by its expression in (A.7) yields 
K K K L 9kU~(q, (3) = L 7rkU~(q, (3)+ L (Fk - Gk) [qk+1 (q) (1 - (3k) + (3kqk(q)] (Vk+l - Vk) . 
k=l k=l k=lk 
Finally, taking into account that the structural form m satisfies EXABB one has 
K K K L 7rkU~(q, (3) = L 7rkU k(m) = L Vk7rkQk(q)· 
k=l k=l k=l 
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Therefore 
K K K 
~ 9kU:(q, /3) = ~ Vk1l"kqk(q)+ ~ (Fk - Gk) [qk+1 (q) (1 - /3k) + ,Bkqk(q)] (Vk+1 - Vk) , 
k=1 k=l k=lk (A.8) 
Finally,recall from the definitions that for any q E Q nd all k = 1,2, ... , K one has 
(A9) 
Substituting each qk(q) in (A8) by its expression in (A.9) yields 
which establishes (A.6). 
(2) It is now shown that for every mechanism in reduced form (q, /3) E QR X 
[0,1(-1 one has 
K K 
~ 9kUt-(q, /3g) ~ ~ 9kUt-(q, /3). (A.lO) 
k=1 k=l 
To prove this statement, notice from (A.9) that for each q E QR, the function 
L~=1 9kUt-(q,,) is differentiable on with respect to /3 and it satisfies, for each 
k= 1,2, ... ,K-l, 
8(L~=19kU[i(q,f3)) _ _ '+1' 
8/3
k 
= (Fk - Gk) [qk(q) - qk+1(q)] [v' - v'] . (A.ll) 
Since for each k = 1,2, ... , K -1 one has [qk(q) - qk+1 (q)] ::; 0, (A.ll) implies that 
L~=1 9kU[i(q,·) is non-increasing in /3k if Fk - Gk > 0, and it is non-decreasing 
in /3k if Fk - Gk < 0, which establishes (AlO). 
(3) To complete the proof, observe that since q* satisfies (T.2.2) one has, for 
every q E QR 
K K 
L9kUt-(q*,/3g) ~ L9kUt-(q,/3g), (A.12) 
k=1 k=1 
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which yields, for every {3* satisfying (T.2.1) and every mechanism in reduced form 
(q, (3) E QR X [0, 1t-1 , 
K K K K 
L9kUf(q*,{3*) = L9kUf(q*,{39) ~ L9kUf(q,{39) > L9kUf(q,{3). 
k=l k=l k=l k=l 
Therefore (q*, (3*) maximizes Ef=l gkU}:C .), which establishes Theorem 2. 11 
Theorem 3. Let 9 E b.S be arbitrary. Then a mechanism in reduced form 
(q*,{3*) E MR solves (P.2) if and only if there exists )..* E !l!-l such that 
(T.3.1) {3* is equivalent (with respect to q*) to a sharin9 rule (39 satisfying (SR); 
(T.3.2) q* satisfies, for each 11. E V, 
q*(11.) = 
K 
0, whenever ~ wf()..9)nk < ° : 
k=l 
K . 
1, whenever ~ wf()..9)nk > 0, 
k=l 
(T.3.2) ).* E~! satisfies, for each k = 2,3, ... ,K, 
Proof. 
Only if Let 9 E b.S be arbitrary and let (q*, (3*) E MR be a solution to (P.2) . 
It is shown that there exists).* E ~!-l. such that (T.3.1) to (T.3.3) are satisfied. 
F)rst, it is shown that (q*, (3*) satisfies (T.3.1). To prove this statement, sup-
pose not. Then (A.ll) yields 
K K 
~9kUf(q*,{39) > ~9kUf(q*,{3*), 
k=l k=l 
a contradiction. Therefore (q*, (3*) satisfies (T.3.2). 
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Since f3* and f3g are equivalent, it follows that q* solves the constrained opti-
mization problem 
K 
max '" 9kUf-(q, f3g) 
qEQ L k=l 
s.t : qk+l(q) - qk(q) ~ 0; k = 2,3, ... ,K-1. (P.3) 
Let £g : Q X ~K-1 --+ ~, be the Lagrangian function associated to (P.3). The 
Lagrangian is defined, for all (q,'\) E Q X !RK-1, by 
K K-1 
£g(q,'\) = L 9kUf-(q, f3g) + L'\k (qk+1 (q) - qk(q)) , 
k=l k=l 
or, equivalently, by 
By the Sadle Point. Theorem in Linear Programing, there exists ,\ * such that, for 
every (q,'\) E Q X ~~-l one has 
Observe that since q* maximizes £g(" ,\*) one has, for each n E D, 
q*(n) = 
K 
0, whenever L wf('\*)nk < 0, 
k=l 
K 
1, whenever L wf('\*)nk > O. 
k=l 
(A.I3) 
Thus, the pair (q*, ,\g) satisfies (T.3.2). Finally, (T.3.3) follows from the fact that 
,\ * minimizes the Lagrangian function on !R~ -1. Thus, for every solution (q*, f3*) 
to (P.2), there exists ,\* E ~~-1 such that (T.3.I) to (T.3.3) are satisfied, which 
establishes the Only if statement in Theorem 1. 
32 
If. 
To prove sufficiency, suppose there exists a mechanism in reduced form (q*, (3*) E 
QA X [O,l)K-l and a vector ).* E ~-l such that (T.3.1) to (T.3.3) are satisfied. 
To show (q*, (3*) solve (P.2), observe that the pair (q*,). *) is a sadle point of 
the Lagrangian function associated to (P.3) and therefore q* solves (P.3). Since 
(3* is equivalent to a vector ((39) satisfying (SR) one has, for every mechanism 
(q, (3) E QA X [0,1]]('-1 , 
K K K K 
L9kUf-(q*, (3*) = L9kUf-(q*,(39) ~ L9kUf-(q,(39} ~ L 9kUf-(q, (3). 
k=l k=l k=l k=l 
Therefore (q*, /3*) maximizes L:~=l 9k U fi ( " .), which establishes that (q* , (3*) solves 
(P.2) and therefore complet.es the Proof of Theorem 3.11 
Proposition 3. Suppose K ~ 4, V2 < ° and VK-1 ~ 0. Then an interim 
incentive efficient referendum mechanism does not exist. 
Proof. By Theorem 3, it. is sufficient. to show there do not exist Cl( E [0,1] and 
9 E !::::.S satisfying, for all k E {1, 2, ... , K} , . 
w~(.).*) = -Cl( whenever Vk < 0, 
and 
wf().*) = 1 - Cl( whenever Vk > 0; 
where w g (>. *) is a vector of weights associated to a solution (q*, (3*) to (P.3) . 
To prove this statement, recall that for each k E {1, 2, ... , K} , 
Since K ~ 4, 'V2 < ° and VK-l > 0, it follows that there exists pE {2, ... , K - 2} 
such that wf = -Cl( for each k :::; p and w~ = 1- Cl( for each k > p. Since ).; satisfies 
33 
one has ).; = O. Note also that w~().*) - wH).*) = 0 , which by definition implies 
o = 
(A.14) 
Taking into account that, for each k E {I, 2, ... , K} one has {3k = 0 whenever 
Fk - Gk > 0 and {3k = 1 whenever Fk - 9k < 0 one obtains, for each k = 1,2, ... , K, 
and 
Hence, (A.16) is satisfied only if Fp - Gp < O. It follows that {3p = 1 and therefore, 





- GK-l) ( (3 ) ( ) 7rK 1 - K-l VK - VK-l ~ 0 
hence wk > W~+l' a contradiction. This completes the proof of Proposition 3.11 
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